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Abstract 
Subsidies have played a significant role in the production of agriculture during the 20th 
century. While the western world gradually phased out protectionist policies for 
industrialized sectors of the economy following World War II, agriculture continued to 
receive significant support from the state until efforts were made to establish more 
laissez-faire markets in the 1990’s by the World Trade Organization. This paper aims to 
judge the effectiveness of these policies on one program in particular: export credit 
guarantees. By examining the effects of credit guarantees on US wheat exports through 
panel data regressions, this paper hopes to provide evidence of the effectiveness of recent 
policy in creating egalitarian and free markets for agricultural commodities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Table of Contents 
I. Statement of Topic ………………………………………………………..4 
 i. The Importance of Agricultural Subsidies…………………………………..…..4 
 ii. Export Credit Guarantees……………………………………………………....6 
 iii. Wheat………………………………………………………………………..…9 
 iv. Recent Criticism of Subsidies...………………………………………………11 
 v. Hypothesis……………………………………………………………………..13 
 
II. Literature Review…………………………………………………….…12 
 i. Export Credit Guarantees: the commodity credit corporation and US   
agricultural export policy……………………………………………………..….12 
 ii. Option Values for Provisions in Export Credit Guarantees……………….…..13 
 iii. Credit Guarantee Programs and US Market Share in Selected Wheat Import 
Markets…………………………………………………………………………..14 
 iv. Additionality of Credit Guarantees for U.S. Wheat Exports…………………15 
 v.  Influence and Additional Analysis……………………………………………16 
 
III. Methodology………………………….…………………………….….17 
 i. Overview………………………………………….………………………..…..17 
 ii. Data……………………………………………….………………………..….17 
 iii. Model………………………………………………………………………....20 
 
IV. Regressions……………………………………………….……………21 
 i. First Regression…………………………………………………………….….21 
 ii. Second Regression………………………………………………………….....21 
 iii. Regions…………………………………………………………………….....22 
 
V. Discussion………………………………………………………………23 
 i. GSM Coefficient……………………………………………………………….23 
 ii. Freight Coefficient……………………………………………....…………….23 
 iii. Elasticity Coefficient…………………………………………....…………....25 
 
VI. Conclusion………………………………………………….………….29 
 
VII. Appendix……………………………………………….....…………...31 
 
VIII. Works Cited……………………………………………………...…...35 
 i. Data Sources.…………………………………………………………...……...35 
 ii. Articles, Books, and Papers…………………………………...……...…….…35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
I. Statement of Topic 
 
i. The Importance of Agricultural Subsidies 
In 1995 The World Trade Organization (WTO) was officially established to 
replace the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), marking a new era of 
regulation in international trade. It was formed with the mandate to introduce 
international agreements that reduce impediments to trade in order to foster global 
economic growth and development (World Trade Organization). Along with the WTO 
came landmark trade policy through the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture that 
regulated trade in agriculture, a sector of the world economy that had escaped regulation 
under the GATT for decades. More specifically, the Uruguay Round of Agreements on 
Agriculture focused on three major sources of trade distortion; tariffs, domestic support 
and export subsidies. Through this agreement, various countries set limits for direct 
support of crops through export subsidies and domestic support as well as “bindings and 
reductions of tariffs” to liberalize trade (Agreement on Agriculture 1999, pp. 45-46). 
The international trade of agricultural commodities and the way it is regulated is 
important for a variety of reasons. Not only is agriculture a basic source of survival for 
humanity, it is also one of the first goods to be produced in surplus and traded. 
Agricultural trade is also a necessity in many countries, as “political borders do not 
coincide with the land required to support each given national population” (Hawkes 
2009, p. 16). This creates a situation where nations such as the United States, rich in 
resources and factors of production, can export agricultural goods to countries like South 
Korea, which has less capacity to produce food to meet the needs of its citizens. One 
recent event that underscores the importance of agricultural trade is the food crisis of 
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2008. This occurred when agricultural commodities drastically rose in price due to a 
myriad of macroeconomic factors. Rising food prices hindered the world’s ability to feed 
itself and affected poor nations the most. The crisis led many governments to raise tariffs 
on agricultural commodities in order to preserve food stores for their domestic population 
and lead to a drop in over all trade that exacerbated the food shortage. As a result of these 
events, the World Bank estimated that an additional 100 million people could not afford a 
minimal amount of food to live a productive and healthy life, bringing the world total to 
one billion people (Hawkes 2009, pp. 30-31). 
 New policies under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture have generally 
been seen as a positive direction in agricultural trade. One reason for this is that trade 
liberalization is widely considered by economists as an ameliorating factor against 
poverty (Winters 2004, p. 72). This is because tariffs and support, such as domestic 
support and export subsidies, curtail the “free flow of goods,” undermining the optimal 
placement of goods that maximize welfare (Hawkes 2009, 17). Tariffs, in particular, are 
seen as having a negative effect on trade as they raise the price of imports. This results in 
an effective tax on imported agriculture and makes it more expensive for people to feed 
themselves (Hawkes 2009, p. 17). Domestic support distorts trade by giving direct 
payments to farmers. Similarly, export subsidies give farmers bonuses for selling exports 
to certain markets. This effectively allows farmers to sell goods for a lower cost than they 
normally would be able to. 
Additionally, trade distortions in agriculture can lead to over production from 
countries with subsidies. Countries without subsidies, typically poor, have a more 
difficult time competing with subsidized agricultural commodities in the international 
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market. The damage done to the agricultural sector of the economy is even more onerous 
as poor countries often rely on agriculture as a source of GDP more than rich countries do 
(Peters 2006, p. 32). However, subsidization also leads to lower agricultural commodity 
prices. This means that countries importing agricultural goods can benefit from such 
policies because they lower the cost of food (Peters 2006, p. 30). Therefore, these policies 
can lead to an underdeveloped agricultural sector of their economy in poor countries 
while developing a reliance on other nations to provide the food needed to sustain its 
society. As the 2008 food crisis shows, this can yield undesirable consequences.  
ii. Export Credit Guarantees 
Though the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture is a step towards 
agricultural trade liberalization, many believe that it has not gone far enough and needs 
further amendments. Along with topics previously discussed under the Uruguay Round, 
the role of export credit guarantees, food aid, and state trading enterprises on trade are 
now being discussed under the new round of negations, the Doha Round (Anania 2005, p. 
546). Of particular interest is the affect that export credit guarantees can have on trade. 
As defined by the USDA, export credit guarantees are agreements where “exporting 
nations offer to guarantee private bank loans with competitive (commercial) interest 
rates” (Ackerman 2001). Credit guarantees are defended as a way for credit or foreign 
currency constrained nations to import agricultural products as well as to maintain a 
market for domestic producers (Ackerman 2001). Export credit guarantees do not affect 
exports through direct payments, such as the case of export subsidies, but have been 
called into question because of their ability to artificially increase the competitiveness of 
exports from a particular country. 
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In the United States, export credit guarantees are performed through the 
Commodity Credit Corporation under the GSM-102 and GSM-103 programs (Fact Sheet: 
Commodity Credit Corporation 1999, p. 3). Through these programs, US banks “finance 
the export of the commodities, and the CCC guarantees repayment to the US banks” 
(Fact Sheet: Commodity Credit Corporation 1999, p. 3) The programs are identical 
except GSM-102 covers loans lasting from one to three years while GSM-103 lasts from 
3 to 10 years. Additionally, the programs are used primarily “where credit is necessary to 
increase or maintain U.S. exports and where private financial institutions may be 
unwilling to provide financing without the CCC’s guarantee” (Fact Sheet: Commodity 
Credit Corporation 1999, pp. 3-4). Export credit guarantee programs were first 
authorized in the United States under the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (Ho 2010, p. 9) 
and Mexico, South Korea, the former Soviet Union, Iraq and Algeria have received the 
most credit guarantees historically. Close to fifty financial institutions are approved to 
operate under the program and notable participants include JP Morgan Chase and Bank 
of America (U.S. Financial Institutions Approved To Be Assignees Under CCC's Export 
Programs, 2011). Commodities benefiting the most from credit guarantees in the US for 
2009 were “wheat, meat and poultry, oilseeds, feed grains, protein meals, and cotton” 
(Ho 2010, p 10). 
Numerous advocates of free trade, including the Cairns Group, have claimed that 
export credit guarantees can lead to trade distortions. Particularly, the US has been cited 
as the worst offender with $5.5 billion available for credit guarantees each year. Due to 
this, the Cairns Group, comprised of nations including Argentina, Canada, and Australia, 
allege that the US uses credit guarantees as an implicit subsidy that lowers the cost of 
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borrowing for nations importing US exports (Export Subsidies: Detrimental to 
Developing Country Exports ). They argue that lower borrowing rates through the CCC 
decrease the overall cost of buying US exports and that this acts as an implicit subsidy. 
Credit guarantees under the CCC are also viewed as inequitable because developing 
nations may not have the same resources to compete through their own credit guarantee 
programs (Export Subsidies: Detrimental to Developing Country Exports).  
These complaints came to a forefront in 2005 when Brazil, a member of the 
Cairns Group, filed a complaint with the WTO regarding US subsidies to cotton. Brazil is 
a major competitor to the US in cotton exports and believed that world cotton prices fell 
as a result of US cotton subsidies. Brazil alleged that price distortions through the GSM-
102 and 103 programs, among other actions, had led to a loss of $600 million worth of 
cotton exports in the year 2001 alone (Abdelnour 2007, p 2). The WTO concluded that 
credit guarantees under GSM-102 and GSM-103 were prohibited subsidies because the 
“financial benefits returned to the government by these programs failed to cover their 
long-run operating cost” (Schnepf 2009, p 2). As a result of this ruling, the US was 
forced to discontinue the GSM-103 program and added a risk based lending system to 
GSM-102, which officially came into law through the 2008 Farm Bill (Ho 2010, p. 11).  
iii. Wheat 
One of the most interesting commodities to examine export credit guarantees 
under in the US is wheat. Wheat is one of the world’s most important food sources and is 
a staple in many societies in the form of breads and pastas. It is also one of the most 
heavily traded agricultural commodities, with the United States as the global leader in 
wheat exports. Wheat is generally exported from wealthy countries, with the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and European Union accounting for over 60% of global wheat 
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exports. This is in contrast to wheat importers who, though more diverse than wheat 
exporters, are typically “developing countries with limited production potential” (US 
Wheat Trade ). To illustrate this point, the USDA ERS believes that “population growth 
in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and other developing 
countries will be the basis of future expansion of world wheat trade” (US Wheat Trade). 
Figure 1
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Created by author using data from “World Grain Statistics”, 2009 
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Figure 2.
2
 
 
The wheat trade came into recent news when Russia temporarily banned exports 
beginning on August 15th, 2010. The worst draught in “at least a half a century in Russia” 
and its ensuing wildfires led the Russian Government to implement the ban to protect 
Russian’s from high wheat prices. Wheat stockpiles had also fallen because of too little 
rain in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the EU and too much rain in Canada and Pakistan. The 
ban led to a 23 month high for wheat prices and the rise in prices was faster than the 
spike that led to the 2008 food crisis (The Telegraph, 2010). This was then coupled with 
unusually dry seasons in China and Australia that led to a two and a half year high in 
February. As a result, demand for American wheat has risen to its greatest level in 
decades (Polansek 2011). The effects of the price increase in wheat are ubiquitous, with 
many experts citing the rise of food prices as a catalyst for the political unrest in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Libya, and other parts of the Arab world in the beginning of 2011 (Food Prices 
                                                
2 Created by author using data from “World Grain Statistics”, 2009 
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and Supply, 2011). This is yet another example of the current importance of wheat 
exports and its significant impact on the world.  
Wheat is also an interesting commodity to study in this case because it has a 
significant history of subsidization, particularly through export subsidies given to farmers 
by the US and EEC during the 1980’s. The Food Security Act of 1985 established the 
Export Enhancement Program to help US farmers compete with European farmers 
receiving heavy subsidies. The EEP offered a subsidy through cash bonuses to farmers 
from the USDA to allow them to “sell US agricultural products in targeted countries at 
prices below the exporter’s costs of acquiring them” (EEP Fact Sheet). The major 
recipient of the EEP was wheat exports, with close to 80% of subsidies going to wheat 
and wheat flour (Ho and Hanrahan 2010, p. 6). This had a dramatic effect on trade and 
caused an 8-13% increase in US exports by some studies (Brooks 1989, p. 29). Following 
the effective discontinuation of the EEP after 1995 (Ho 2010, p. 6), wheat continued to 
receive aid as one of the largest recipients of export credit guarantees through the CCC. 
iv. Recent Criticism of Subsidies 
 Much as international wheat prices now play a significant role in the events that 
are driving our world, debate over agricultural subsidies is now being publically debated 
with the 2012 Farm Bill approaching. Along with the arguments of equity and fairness 
put forth by the Cairns Group, critics of subsidies allege that they adversely affect the 
health of Americans while mainly benefiting the major corporations that make up US 
agribusiness. They allege that the incentives to grow corn, soy, wheat, cotton and rice, the 
major recipients of subsidies in the US, lead farmers to ignore the types of produce that 
are best for public health. This has led the cost of fresh vegetables to rise over the years 
while foods that are comprised of artificially cheap corn and soy, particularly soda, have 
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dropped in price. Additionally, it is alleged that the subsidies are part of a bloated system 
where “wealthy growers are paid even in good years, and may receive drought aid when 
there’s no drought.” With these facts in mind, many question why the current Farm Bill 
has 30 billion dollars earmarked for subsidies, with 5 billion as direct subsidies, and 
wonder whether subsidies should be continued after 2012 (Bittman, 2011).  
v. Hypothesis 
In light of these facts, the impact of credit guarantees on the United States’ share 
of wheat exports will be the focus of this paper. Specifically, the paper will test the 
hypothesis that changes in international agricultural trade have diminished the impact of 
credit guarantees on United States’ wheat exports in the 2000’s. This paper comes at a 
pertinent time with volatile commodity prices and current negotiations over agricultural 
subsidies through the Doha Round and the 2012 Farm Bill enter public debate. I hope to 
contribute to the public discourse on export credit guarantees following my analysis by 
assessing the impact of the GSM-102 and determining whether it should persist as a law 
in the future. 
 
II. Literature Review 
i. Export Credit Guarantees: the commodity credit corporation and US agricultural 
export policy 
Much has been written about the affects that direct export subsidies have on a 
nation’s imports, but export credit guarantees have been examined in less detail. One 
interesting paper on the topic is “Export Credit Guarantees: the commodity credit 
corporation and US agricultural export policy” by Hyberg, Smith, Skully, and Davison. 
This paper hypothesizes that the difference in credit worthiness between an importer and 
exporter can lead to a subsidy through lowered borrowing rates when export credit 
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guarantees are used (Hyberg 1995, p. 28). The paper focuses on agricultural exports 
guaranteed under the CCC from 1979 to 1992. It looks at the difference in borrowing 
rates between importers and the United States in order to calculate the value of the credit 
guarantee using present value calculations (Hyberg 1995, p. 29). By doing this, the 
authors found that total discounts realized by importers through export credit guarantees 
by CCC amounted to 4.5% of the total credit guaranteed (Hyberg 1995, p. 32). This 
resulted in a total discount of $1.5 billion to importers over the period. Additionally, 
wheat was found to have the largest discount, coming in at 7% of the total amount of 
credit guaranteed. Ultimately, the authors conclude that export credit guarantees represent 
a mutually beneficial arrangement for exporters and importers. The program is estimated 
to have little actual cost to the US government and is seen as a viable way to increase 
agricultural exports. Importing countries, on the other hand, benefit because they can 
consume grains at a lower cost (Hyberg 1995, p. 36).  
ii. Option Values for Provisions in Export Credit Guarantees 
Another interesting work focused on export credit guarantees in the wheat market 
is  “Option Values for Provisions in Export Credit Guarantees” by Dahl, Wilson, and 
Gustafson. This paper analyses the value export credit guarantees entail for importing 
nations using a variant of the Black-Scholes model. Here, the authors compare credit 
guarantees to a put option on a stock since both have a limited liability element (Dahl 
1999, p. 509). The guarantee can be viewed as a put option because the value of the credit 
guarantee increases as the importer is less likely to pay and decreases when they are more 
likely to pay. The study found that with premiums of typically .15%-.67%, the option 
value of export credit guarantees exceeded the value of the income received from the 
loan, which they felt constituted an implicit subsidy (Dahl 1999, p. 522). Overall, the 
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authors found that importers of wheat using the GSM-102 program received a subsidy of 
14.1% of their cost (Dahl 1999, p. 523). While this study concludes export credit 
guarantees represent a larger subsidy than previously thought, i.e. Hyberg’s conclusion, 
the authors admit their findings are highly sensitive to parameters (Dahl 1999, p. 523). 
For instance, volatility of letters of credit cannot be empirically found, which means a 
level of skepticism should be held when one interprets the results of this paper. 
iii.  Credit Guarantee Programs and US Market Share in Selected Wheat Import 
Markets 
An additional paper that is very pertinent to the topic of export credit guarantees 
in the wheat market is “Credit Guarantee Programs and US Market Share in Selected 
Wheat Import Markets” by Vidyashankara Satyanarayana and Demcey D. Johnson. The 
objective of this paper is to examine the “effects of credit guarantees on U.S. wheat 
exports to major recipient countries” (Satyanarayana 1998, p. iii ) as well as to examine 
the “optimal” use of credit guarantees for US wheat (Satyanarayana 1998, p. 2). The 
authors use an Armington demand function with US share of wheat imports as the 
dependant variable and credit guarantees as an additional explanatory variable. The 
authors favor this model because it is an alternative to “ad hoc econometric 
specifications” and “is based on utility maximization and distinguishes goods by country 
of origin” (Satyanarayana 1998, p. 3).3 By applying this model to six different countries 
from 1980 to 1997 the authors conclude that all six countries except for Korea have a 
positive response to credit guarantees at accepted levels of significance (Satyanarayana 
1998, p. 6).  
                                                
3 Their model will be discussed further in section III. Methodology 
15 
Additionally, the authors examine the marginal impact of credit guarantees and 
find that the marginal impact declines as sales under export credit guarantees increase 
(Satyanarayana 1998, p. 8). Due to this they conclude that revenue would increase if 
export credit guarantees became less concentrated among a few countries and note that 
this has been the case with the GSM program since 1989 (Satyanarayana 1998, p. 8). 
Along with this, the authors create optimization equations using the Armington demand 
function to see how the placement of export credits could maximize export revenue. The 
authors find that the actual GSM sales differ significantly from optimal sales. In 
particular, sales to Korea and Morocco were greater than their model suggests while 
Algeria, Brazil, and Tunisia received less than the model predicts.  
iv. Additionality of Credit Guarantees for U.S. Wheat Exports 
One more work written on the effects of credit guarantees on US wheat exports is 
“Additionality of Credit Guarantees for U.S. Wheat Exports” by Mathew A. Dierson, 
William W. Wilson, Bruce L. Dahl, and Vidyashankara Satyanarayana. The intent of this 
paper, among other things, is to “define additionality attributable to credit guarantees and 
develop a model to explain how guarantees translate into increased wheat exports” 
(Dierson 1997, p. 2) The authors develop an ad hoc cross-sectional time-series model that 
could be viewed as a demand function for wheat. The model includes imports from the 
US, Canada and Australia to five different countries and includes the price of wheat 
exported from each country as well as the implicit subsidy granted through credit 
guarantees (Dierson 1997, p. 11). The values of subsidies for French and Canadian 
exports are difficult to extrapolate and were therefore replaced with observed proxies in 
the model (Dierson 1997, p. 11). As a result of this regression, the authors found “that a 
$1000 change in the subsidy value… resulted in a 57 MT… change in imports… during 
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the sample period” (Dierson 1997, p. 15) Due to this, the study found that an additional 
12.6 MMT of wheat was exported over the 13-year period. Additionally, the study 
concludes that the CCC credit guarantees have been about four times more effective on a 
per dollar basis then the EEP and that competing export subsidy programs have a 
significant negative impact on the effectiveness of US credit guarantees.  
v. Influence and Additional Analysis 
Given these works, I plan to model my methodology after the paper “Credit 
Guarantee programs and US Market Share in Selected Wheat Import Markets” by 
Vidyashankara Satyanarayana and Demcey D. Johnson. The paper lends itself well 
because it implicitly includes the effects of the subsidy of credit guarantees instead of 
directly including a derived amount for the subsidy such as in the studies by Hyberg et al 
and Dierson et al. This is important because the move to risk adjusted interest rates now 
used under GSM-102 makes it more difficult to compute the subsidy found in credit 
guarantees.  I feel that this study will yield interesting results about how export credit 
guarantees have changed in the import market for US wheat in the 12 years since the 
paper was published. This change can be attributed to the discontinuation of the GSM-
103 program and the EEP as well as the addition of variable pricing of interest rates 
under GSM-102.  I believe that my analysis will add to the academic body of work 
performed on export credit guarantees since I am unable to find a relevant study that 
focuses on the first decade of the 21st century. 
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III. Methodology 
i. Overview 
My analysis is patterned after the study “Credit Guarantee programs and US 
Market Share in Selected Wheat Import Markets” by Vidyashankara Satyanarayana and 
Demcey D. Johnson. As a result, I will use a panel data regression analyzing the effects 
of the GSM-102 Program, the elasticity price for wheat, and an additional variable of the 
cost of freight of US wheat exports to various importing regions. I focused my study on 
ten regions but had two drop two due to concerns arising from econometric tests. The 
regions in this paper are defined by the USDA FAS while reporting the use of its GSM-
102 Program and a table detailing the countries in each region is included in the 
appendix. The regions were chosen as both major recipients of GSM-102 credit 
guarantees for US wheat exports and as countries who rely significantly on the US to 
satisfy their demand for wheat.  
ii. Data 
Data for GSM-102 guaranteed loans was found using the USDA FAS’s “Monthly 
Summary of Export Credit Guarantee Program Activity”. Data for wheat prices and 
shipping costs were found in the 2009 “World Grain Statistics” published by the 
International Grains Council. Additionally, data for US wheat exports was found using 
the USDA FAS’s “Export Sales Query System” in order to get yearly totals ending on 
September 30. Therefore, each year is defined as October 1st to September 30 in order to 
be consistent with the way GSM-102 credit guaranteed are reported.  
Wheat prices ware reported monthly in the “World Grain Statistics” and are taken 
as the average of various grades of wheat for the twelve months from October to 
September for a given year. The elasticity of demand for US wheat was taken as the cost 
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of wheat from the US divided by the cost of competing wheat exports. The denominator 
of the elasticity of demand for US wheat for a given region was determined by looking at 
“All Wheat Trade: Main Origins and Destinations” for 2007/8 and 2008/9 in the “World 
Grain Statistics” in order to establish a given market for wheat imports to a region. The 
market used for a given region can be found in the appendix. I felt that the elasticity of 
demand for US wheat was more adequate then the absolute price of wheat because 
economic theory tells us the overall price of wheat should not significantly affect overall 
demand. The change of US wheat alone reveals very little since wheat is a necessary 
good and demand has little correlation with absolute price changes. This is consistent 
with the time period of this study since wheat prices have been highly volatile while 
consumption has steadily risen. This choice is also consistent with the study conducted by 
Satyanarayana and Johnson, which my analysis is modeled on. 
The cost of freight was taken from the “World Grain Statistics” annual averages 
for select major routes. Some regions did not have ports listed in the “World Grain 
Statistics” and proxies had to be used to approximate their shipping costs. For instance, 
the cost of shipping a ton of freight to Morocco was used as a proxy for the cost of 
shipping to Algeria.  
The amount of money guaranteed under the GSM-102 program by each region 
and the amount of US exports to each region are as follows:  
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Figure 3
4
 
 
Figure 4
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Created by the author using data from USDA FAS ”Export Sales Query System”  
5 Created by the author using data from USDA FAS’s “Monthly Summary of Export 
Credit Guarantee Program Activity” 
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iii. Model 
After this information was collected, I analyzed my data using the following  
regression: 
!"#$%&' ! !!! ! !"#!! ! !"#$%&'&%(!! ! !"#$%!!!! ! ! 
 
I employed various linear, logarithmic, and semi-logarithmic regressions in order 
to find the line of best fit. Through this, I determined that a regression taking the natural 
logarithms of the variables had the most significant explanatory power for my analysis 
using an OLS regression. Additionally, I used a fixed effects panel data regression for my 
analysis. A panel data model, or longitudinal model, has both a cross-sectional and time 
series component (Dougherty 2007, 408). A fixed effects panel regression is manipulated 
in order to remove the unobserved effect so that the models explains “the variations about 
the mean of the dependent variable in terms of the variations about the means of the 
explanatory variables for the group of observations relating to a given individual.” This 
process has the benefit of addressing unobserved heterogeneity bias (Dougherty 2007, p. 
412). A random effects model is generally preferred to a fixed effects model because 
characteristics that remain constant for each region are kept in the model and n degrees of 
freedom do not have to be dropped as is the case in a fixed effects regression. However, 
as the major recipients of US wheat export credit guarantees, the regions analyzed in my 
model are not drawn randomly from a given population and therefore break one of two 
necessary conditions to perform a random effects regression (Dougherty 2007, pp. 418-
419).  
Following this, each panel was tested for serial correlation using the Durbin - 
Watson Test. Concerns of serial correlation led two regions, the Caribbean and Turkey, to 
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be dropped from the regression. Therefore, my final data set included eight different 
regions with a maximum of ten observations and a minimum of three per region. Data 
used for this paper and other relevant graphs can be found in the appendix. 
 
Regressions: 
i. First Regression 
 My first regression is as follows and was significant at the 1% level of 
significance using an F-test. This regression gave coefficients that are significantly 
different from zero for the GSM variable and the freight variable but showed that the 
coefficient for the elasticity of demand for US wheat was not significantly different from 
zero.  
Table 1 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic P>|t| 
GSM 0.14632 0.05736 2.55 0.014 
Elasticity 0.03365 1.0003 0.03 0.973 
Freight 0.20284 0.0975 2.08 0.043 
Constant 12.860 0.45873 28.03 0 
 
ii. Second Regression 
Dropping the elasticity variable led to a new regression with an F-statistic significant at 
the 1% level of significance and coefficients significant at the 5% level of confidence.  
Table 2 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic P>|t| 
GSM 0.014638 0.05674 2.58 0.013 
Freight .20392 0.09116 2.24 0.03 
Constant 12.851 0.37852 33.95 0 
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iii. Regions 
Regression results for five of the eight regions that have been analyzed. These regions all 
possess insignificant coefficients, which is likely due to the small sample size present in 
the individual panels.  
Table 3 
Region Variable Coefficient Standard Error t statistic P>|t| 
Central 
America 
GSM 0.09499 0.16044 0.59 0.572 
  Freight 0.54777 0.41644 1.32 0.23 
Mexico GSM -0.09208 0.0779 -1.18 0.29 
  Freight 0.22216 0.14441 1.54 0.185 
South 
America 
GSM 0.17778 0.09078 1.96 0.091 
  Freight 0.40062 0.17167 2.33 0.052 
Southeast  
Asia 
GSM 0.01824 0.12362 0.15 0.887 
  Freight 0.2319 0.14855 1.56 0.162 
South 
Korea 
GSM 0.08367 0.11326 0.74 0.484 
  Freight -0.02735 0.06863 -0.4 0.702 
 
 Therefore, my model was not able to add significant insight on the effects of the 
GSM-102 program or cost of freight for the regions that were analyzed individually. 
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Discussion: 
i. GSM Coefficient 
The final regression reveals that a 1% increase in GSM-102 guaranteed loans by a 
country leads to a .014% increase in US wheat exports to a country. This finding is 
logical and indicates that operational changes in the US’ export credit guarantee program 
have made the subsidy component of the credit guarantee rather nominal. This is likely 
due to the switch towards a risk based lending system for the GSM-102 program and the 
elimination of the GSM-103 program. This is consistent with my hypothesis and 
indicates that the policies of the WTO have been successful in establishing more free 
trade within agricultural commodities. This indicates that foreign buyers of US wheat use 
the GSM-102 program for reasons other than its subsidy component. One possible reason 
is that buyers are credit or foreign exchange constrained, as the USDA indicates, and the 
GSM-102 program enables them to purchase US exports with greater ease.  
ii. Freight Coefficient 
What is more interesting, and more puzzling, is the positive coefficient of the 
freight variable. This would imply that an increase in shipping costs leads to an increase 
in demand for US wheat. This is a seemingly illogical finding since one would expect 
exports to be negatively correlated with shipping costs since higher shipping costs 
effectively result in more expensive imports. Therefore, a logical coefficient would be 
negative or, if it were the case that a region had no alternative food to wheat available, 
close to zero. However, there are a few different explanations for this coefficient that are 
logical aside from simply being a coincidental and non-causal relationship. One 
explanation could be that the regions sampled are relatively closer to the US than other 
wheat exporting nations. This would mean that the regions examined switch to US wheat 
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with rising fuel prices because shipping in wheat from other exporting nations is more 
expensive. This, however, does not seem to be plausible for the regions included in this 
study. While Mexico is closer to the US than any other major wheat exporting nation, the 
remaining regions are not any closer to the United States than other wheat exporters, 
especially since Canada and Argentina are two major competitors and are relatively close 
proximity to the US.    
 Another reason for freight’s positive coefficient could be a correlation between 
wheat consumption and global economic activity, where freight prices act as a proxy for 
economic activity. It is reported by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global Forecasting 
Service that wheat consumption is expected to rise in the future given economic recovery 
in the developing world (Global Forecasting Service: Wheat). As noted in Section I, 
hundred millions of people are unable to afford an adequate amount of food for 
themselves. They would therefore buy more food, including variants of wheat, as their 
income grows. Additionally, the propensity for societies to eat more meat as they become 
wealthier leads more grains to be consumed. This is because meat is a less efficient food 
source and the amount of grain required to make a meal out of meat is greater than if 
people actually at the grain. It may be that the cost of shipping wheat served as a proxy 
for global economic activity and that wheat consumption therefore had a positive 
correlation with freight prices. The correlation between shipping costs and economic 
activity is likely due to two factors. One is that the cost of fuel goes up as the economy 
grows and more oil is needed. The other is that demand for the use of ships to send 
freight goes up as international trade increases and this leads to higher rates for shipping 
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goods. Looking at the chart below, we can see that the cost of freight and US wheat 
exports to the eight regions studied move somewhat in tandem.  
Figure 5
6
 
 
 
 
iii. Elasticity Coefficient 
Another interesting implication from this regression comes from the fact that the 
elasticity of demand for US wheat exports is not shown to be significantly different from 
zero. This implies that changes in the price of US wheat relative to the price of other 
wheat exports does not affect US wheat exports. The price of US wheat relative to other 
countries would logically seem to be of significance, however this is consistent with 
Satyanarayana and Johnson’s study. This implies that much of the demand for wheat is 
due to exogenous factors and that subsidizing wheat, and likely other agricultural 
                                                
6 Created by the author using data from USDA FAS’ “Export Sales Query System and 
“World Grain Statistics”, 2009 
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products, is not as effective as one would think. Instead, it may be the case that wheat 
demand is largely fixed by society and changes in price, absolute or relative, do not factor 
into countries’ decision making. Looking at global wheat consumption, we can see that 
both the absolute price of wheat, using US Hard Red Winter wheat prices, and the 
relative price of US wheat to other countries are more volatile than global consumption. 
Figure 6
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Created by the author using data from “World Grain Statistics”, 2009 
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Figure 7
8
 
 
 The relationship between wheat consumption and price is logical. As a necessary 
good, wheat is not a product that will have significant changes in demand due to price. In 
simpler terms, people will not choose to stop eating bread just because the price of bread 
rises. Additionally, the fact that the relative price of wheat does not factor into demand 
probably has to do with obstacles faced from conducting international trade. Unlike an 
individual consumer who has little problem going to the store across the street if prices 
are cheaper, buying wheat from foreign countries is more complicated. It is likely that 
consumers establish relationships with producers and that the small relative price changes 
observed here are not significant enough to dissuade buyers to switch. The following 
charts show that the total level of US wheat exports to the regions over the time frame of 
this study remains at about twelve million and that the regions’ total consumption of 
                                                
8 Created by the author using data from “World Grain Statistics”, 2009 
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wheat is relatively constant. This would indicate that wheat exports are influenced by 
exogenous factors that determine supply and demand.  
Figure 8
9
 
 
Figure 9
10
 
 
A given region is going to consume a relatively fixed amount of wheat and domestic 
wheat production and the amount of available wheat exports will largely influence the 
                                                
9 Created by the author using data from “Export Sales Query System” 
10 Created by the author using data from “World Grain Statistics”, 2009 
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US’ share of exports. The fact that the elasticity shown in Figure 6 oscillates at a 
consistent level probably also influences consumers not to switch producers. Lastly, the 
use of financial instruments such as futures, a contract that allows individuals to lock in 
future prices, may shield consumers from price fluctuations thus reducing, which would 
reduce the effect of volatility.  
 
IV. Conclusion: 
 Therefore, my hypothesis that new developments in how the GSM-102 program 
operates will curtail the subsidy element of the program has been proven correct. This 
poses an interesting question as to if the program should be continued under the 2012 
Farm Bill. The answer to this question can only be answered if the stated purpose of US’ 
export credit guarantees is clarified. Given my analysis, it would seem that the GSM-102 
program should be discontinued if its true purpose is to increase US agricultural exports. 
It would appear that the program has little effect in its current form and poses a large 
potential loss for US taxpayers if a country were to default on a US backed loan. While 
history has shown that this is rather unlikely under the program, it would make little 
sense for the US to put itself at risk for billions of dollars in loans for little tangible 
benefit to the American people.  
 If, however, the program is designed to help countries that are credit or foreign 
currency constrained and the use of credit guarantees aids them in feeding their citizens, 
the program should remain intact. As the political upheavals in the Middle East and the 
food riots of 2008 have shown, the availability of affordable foods is paramount for 
preserving peace in many poor parts of the world. This issue will only grow as population 
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growth in the world continues. In many cases, it may be in the United States best interest 
to ensure that countries are able to continue to have access to foods that are basic staples 
for survival, both from a humanitarian and political perspective. It would seem that in this 
case, the financial risk posed by the GSM-102 program is far outweighed by the benefits 
it accrues. As put forth in Section V, the slight subsidy portion of the GSM-102 program 
implies that the credit guarantees are mostly used for issues of foreign currency and credit 
constraint. The only question that seems to remain is whether the program is still 
necessary for countries to obtain agricultural imports. When the program first began over 
30 years ago, the ability of many poor countries to obtain credit was likely harder than it 
is today. However, the continued use of the GSM-102 program indicates that there is still 
some difficulty and the recent credit crunch seen in our financial system shows that credit 
can seize up.  
 Given these facts, it is my belief that the GSM-102 program should continue to 
exist. The results of my analysis indicate that the GSM-102 program grants access to 
bank loans that are often used to acquire food while constituting only a slight subsidy. 
This means that the program does not curtail international free trade and is largely in 
compliance with agreements under the WTO. Additionally, past studies have shown that 
the program costs the US little. Given the appalling number of people who are unable to 
feed themselves, I think it is only right that the United States would continue a program 
whose main affect is allowing poor countries more ease to feed its citizens 
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Appendix: 
i. Raw Data: 
!"#$% &"'()*% +,-)$./%
0123
456% 7$(8"% 9$"(':.% ;<#/.(8(.=%
6555% ><'"$(#% ?@A?6@% 5% 466% 21.83 5B@CA6@D5@E%
6554% ><'"$(#% 45CDE6% 4DBF% 4EE% 20.24 5BC546?E@E6%
6556% ><'"$(#% 6??5DF% DEB6% 4F?% 17.12 5BCC@4?4F5D%
655E% ><'"$(#% 465455% 45B6% 4DA% 25.48 5BC6E65AE54%
655F% ><'"$(#% D66FAA% 5% 4?F% 45.91 5BCFEC56AF4%
655D% ><'"$(#% 6E65AA% 5% 4?F% 40.18 5BCF5DEDDC%
655?% ><'"$(#% 6@6D4C% 5% 4AC% 30.22 5B@F54?E6EA%
655A% ><'"$(#% 46FA?DA% 5% 6F4% 66.16 5BCDFE564D6%
655@% ><'"$(#% @D6@?F% 5% F5E% 72.10 5BCA?E5E?@C%
655C% ><'"$(#% 4?555E% 5% 6FA% 30.74 5B@CFDFA@@@%
6555%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% ??6ECA% 4B@% 466% 13.71 5B@55EE@4FA%
6554%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% ADAAE6% 6DBD% 4EE% 14.81 5B@5C6FE454%
6556%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% 6E?@6D% 4@B6% 4F?% 15.98 5B@DAAACEE?%
655E%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% CAFAF?% DFB6% 4DA% 17.48 5B@5?6?ACEC%
655F%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% 454C6?A% 6C% 4?F% 27.73 5B@DC?@DFC4%
655D%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% CE5AEE% D?B6% 4?F% 25.48 5B@655A6C@C%
655?%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% 4EEAD?4% 6CB6% 4AC% 25.95 5BAC4@A5F6@%
655A%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% 4F?CE6@% E4B4% 6F4% 45.16 5BCE5E6A54%
655@%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% 45DF?4D% @6B4% F5E% 49.09 5B@46@5CF5E%
655C%
G"*.$#<%
>,"$(8#% 4EF?4@6% 466B6% 6FA% 20.60 5BAA4AE5@@%
6555% ;'=-.% D46CCA@% 6?B@% 466% 14.74 4B5D5AFFD46%
6554% ;'=-.% E?DCA4?% 65B6% 4EE% 14.95 4B5DD6E6EEA%
6556% ;'=-.% 6?EDFF?% ?% 4F?% 15.00 4B4F5E54F4C%
655E% ;'=-.% 6@E@A5F% 5% 4DA% 22.02 4B5C6DD6FF4%
655F% ;'=-.% E46?AA6% 5% 4?F% 47.75 4B5?FE?4AFA%
655D% ;'=-.% 4F@6F5F% 5% 4?F% 40.17 4B45D?6FF@A%
655?% ;'=-.% 4FFDA?5% AB@% 4AC% 37.46 4B5@6F65EEA%
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655A% ;'=-.% E@@546?% 5% 6F4% 69.31 4B5E?AAC4CA%
655@% ;'=-.% 65EF54F% 5% F5E% 74.37 4B54AFAED@C%
655C% ;'=-.% 45??6CF% 5% 6FA% 32.93 4B5@5C654F4%
6555% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 4EC5EC6% 4D5% 466% 16.00 5BAFAACD5EF%
6554% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 4E65???% 4D4B4% 4EE% 20.69 5BADCEF6ECA%
6556% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 4DAE5C?% 4?DBE% 4F?% 20.85 5B@6FDD4@4C%
655E% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 46FFC4?% AFB4% 4DA% 33.42 5BA@AC464D?%
655F% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 4ECFD4C% 645BA% 4?F% 58.24 5B@6?6FCC46%
655D% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 46?CF@@% 4DDBA% 4?F% 49.85 5BACF@D55?6%
655?% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 46FED5E% 444BE% 4AC% 42.84 5BA6@C4AFFA%
655A% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 4645AC6% @@BA% 6F4% 79.81 5B@CF?4@5A?%
655@% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 4?5455C% 4AFB4% F5E% 95.05 5B@46@5CF5E%
655C% 1)H.:%I)$"#% 444@FAD% 6EEBE% 6FA% 52.73 5B@6EEC5DCD%
6555% 2"J(8)% 65E6CD?% DCBA% 466% 12.93 5B@55EE@4FA%
6554% 2"J(8)% 64F?D?5% DBE% 4EE% 10.94 5B@5C6FE454%
6556% 2"J(8)% 6DC?455% 6?B4% 4F?% 12.00 5B@DAAACEE?%
655E% 2"J(8)% 6D@E6DC% 4EBA% 4DA% 16.85 5B@5?6?ACEC%
655F% 2"J(8)% 6C?A5?E% E6BC% 4?F% 27.43 5B@DC?@DFC4%
655D% 2"J(8)% 6CAC@DC% 4@BD% 4?F% 22.03 5B@655A6C@C%
655?% 2"J(8)% 6E44?5D% 5% 4AC% 18.42 5BAC4@A5F6@%
655A% 2"J(8)% 6D6?564% 5% 6F4% 40.68 5BCE5E6A54%
655@% 2"J(8)% 6C@C@55% CB@% F5E% 45.02 5B@46@5CF5E%
655C% 2"J(8)% 4A6CAAD% ?CBE% 6FA% 20.10 5BAA4AE5@@%
6555% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% CA@44?% 455B4% 466% 14.00 5B@D4E?@D64%
6554% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 4EFC454% 4FAB?% 4EE% 14.00 5B@DD@4?FCC%
6556% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 6545E4F% 6@4B@% 4F?% 14.00 5BCEDAFFAF6%
655E% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 64FEEC@% 6FDB4% 4DA% 19.44 5B@DD@45EFF%
655F% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 4AA4?C6% E?EBD4% 4?F% 29.88 5BC5D4FE6C?%
655D% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 46CE@AF% 4FDB4% 4?F% 30.81 5BC5@6F4E?F%
655?% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 44FC4FD% 46B6% 4AC% 25.96 5B@F54?E6EA%
655A% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 6FA4FE@% @4BF% 6F4% 46.67 5BCDFE564D6%
655@% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 6D6@D66% 4EFBC% F5E% 56.22 5BC4?D4@DFA%
655C% 1)H.:%>,"$(8#% 4D?F5@C% 4F4B?% 6FA% 30.10 5B@EDDA?664%
6555% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% 6@665FF% ?5% 466% 18.00 5BAFAACD5EF%
6554% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% 46CACAC% 454BA% 4EE% 18.00 5BADCEF6ECA%
6556% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% 6?FA4?@% F6BE% 4F?% 18.00 5B@6FDD4@4C%
655E% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% 64DDFEC% E5BE% 4DA% 31.90 5BA@AC464D?%
655F% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% 65E6E??% CB6% 4?F% 57.72 5B@6?6FCC46%
655D% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% 6A?@A@@% D5BF% 4?F% 61.68 5BACF@D55?6%
655?% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% 6@EAD44% 6?% 4AC% 48.73 5BA6@C4AFFA%
655A% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% E4?ACE4% 6DBF% 6F4% 77.03 5B@CF?4@5A?%
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655@% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% EE5F?6E% C6BC% F5E% 89.98 5B@46@5CF5E%
655C% 1)H.:"#/.%>/(#% 6ED54A6% @DBE% 6FA% 47.52 5B@6EEC5DCD%
6555% K)$L#*% 4DAF?A% DBE% 466% 13.00 4B4C5?5E56?%
6554% K)$L#*% F4566A% F4BE% 4EE% 13.00 4B65C654DAF%
6556% K)$L#*% 454A45% 4CB4% 4F?% 13.00 4BE54?ACA4@%
655E% K)$L#*% @@E5@% 5% 4DA% 29.67 4BE5DD@AA@?%
655F% K)$L#*% E6DF@E% @BF% 4?F% 50.26 4B4?FAD64ED%
655D% K)$L#*% ?E?F% 5% 4?F% 42.05 4B4@F5F455C%
655?% K)$L#*% 4@C45F% 5% 4AC% 45.62 4B4?D5@@4DD%
655A% K)$L#*% 5% 5% 6F4% 73.21 4B5DDC@FDFD%
655@% K)$L#*% FAE5% 5% F5E% 71.20 5BA?E664A4E%
655C% K)$L#*% 5% 5% 6FA% 42.14 5B@ED?F@C5D%
 
ii. Region Definitions 
Region Countries 
Central America Belize, Costa Rica , El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama 
South America Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay 
Southeast Asia Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu 
and Vietnam 
 
iii. Given Wheat Market by Region
11
  
Region Market 
Algeria Argentina, Canada, EU, USA 
Central America Canada, USA 
Egypt Argentina, Canada, EU, USA, Russia 
Jordan EU, USA, Russia 
Mexico Canada, USA 
South America Argentina, Canada, USA 
South Korea Australia, Canada, USA 
Southeast Asia Australia, Canada, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 used in calculating elasticity of demand for US wheat 
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Figure 10
12
 
 
Figure 11
13
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Created by author using data from “World Grain Statistics”, 2009 
13 Created by author using data from “World Grain Statistics”, 2009 
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